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STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF AMICUS 
Utah Shared Access Alliance (^'Amicus"), Utah's largest motorized access 
advocacy organization, is a Utah non-profit corporation representing individuals and 
organizations having a combined membership of approximately 5,500 members. Amicus 
represents individuals and families who rely upon motorized vehicle access for business, 
family needs and recreation throughout Utah, including traveling on Utah paved 
highways, unimproved roads, and R. S. 2477 rights-of-way across federal lands located in 
Utah. Amicus' members use motorized vehicles, including regular passenger vehicles 
and trucks, motorcycles, four wheel drive street-legal vehicles, and off highway vehicles 
such as ATVs, dirt bikes, snowmobiles and four wheel drive vehicles. Amicus' and 
Amicus' members' uses of these vehicles directly depend upon access to Utah's public 
highway system, including R. S. 2477 rights-of-way. 
Amicus and its members regularly participate in local, state and federal agency 
land use planning to protect and preserve motorized access to and on public rights-of-
way. Amicus and its members have been parties or amici in numerous state and federal 
court actions, administrative appeals, and other actions to preserve motorized access. 
The interests of Amicus and its members are directly implicated by this action as 
discussed herein. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Utah governmental authorities have a mandatory duty to "keep the road 
open and in suitable repair." Therefore, Utah courts may issue writs of mandamus 
compelling governmental authorities to keep a public right-of-way open and in suitable 
repair. Such relief appears to be warranted in this action. 
2. The legislature has no power to extinguish an authority's mandatory duty to 
"keep the road open and in suitable repair." The Court should approach Utah's Rights-
of-way Across Federal Lands Act with caution. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A Governing Authority Has a Mandatory Duty to "Keep the Road Open 
and in Suitable Repair." 
The common law and this Court have long recognized that a governing authority 
has a mandatory duty to "keep the road open and in suitable repair." Whitesides v. 
Green, 44 P. 1032, 1033, 13 Utah 341 (Utah 1896). In Whitesides, decided immediately 
after Statehood, the Court stated, 
"The right acquired by prescription and use carries with it such width as is 
reasonably necessary for the public easement of travel, and where the 
public have acquired the easement the land subject to it has passed under 
the jurisdiction of the public authorities, for the purpose of keeping the 
same in proper condition for the enjoyment thereof by the public. Such 
authorities are bound to keep the road open and in suitable repair, and, if 
obstructions be placed thereon, it is their duty to remove the same, and care 
for the rights of the public, 
A. This Duty Cannot Be Avoided or Exterminated. 
The duty of a jurisdictional authority to "keep the road open and in suitable repair" 
recognized in Whitesides is fundamental. Rulings that authorities have nondelegable 
duties to protect the safety of the public exercise due care in maintaining roads within 
their boundaries, rest upon this bedrock duty. 
B. The Ministerial Duty to Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair 
Is Applicable to the Town of Fairfield. 
Amicus understands that the road involved in this case is located within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the Town of Fairfield ("Fairfield"). Under Whitehead and the 
"nondelegable duty" authorities cited in App. Br. at 12-13, Fairfield has a ministerial duty 
to keep the involved road open and in suitable repair. Amicus, therefore, agrees with 
Appellants that Utah courts have the power of mandamus to enforce this ministerial duty. 
Further, the facts in this case, as understood by Amicus, strongly indicate that the road, 
considering its specific circumstances, has been historically used by large and small 
motorized vehicles, is seriously cratered, is harmful to motorized vehicles attempting to 
travel on it, and is dangerous to the public. Assuming such facts, the Court should 
appropriately find 1) that the involved road is not open and/or is not in suitable repair, 
and 2) that a writ of mandamus should issue. 
1
 See authorities cited in App. Br. at pages 12-13. 
See Point II.A., infra, including Notes 8, 9. Limited temporary restrictions consistent 
with the authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair include: 
1) the reasonable need of a highway authority to temporarily "close or restrict travel on a 
highway ... due to construction, maintenance work, or emergency," § 72-6-114(a), Utah 
Code; 2) the reasonable temporary closure of roads for national defense purposes, § 76-
8-809, Utah code; and 3) the temporary re-routing of a portion of an R. S. 2477right-of-
way for environmental reasons, with an alternative replacement route portion being 
essential to keep the road open, § 72-5-105(3). These temporary actions apply uniformly 
to all users and modes of transportation. 
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C. Alleged Practical Problems Do Not Relieve an Authority from 
Mandamus. 
Amicus realizes that an authority might complain of budgeting or other problems 
that might interfere with the authority's immediate ability to suitably repair a road. Such 
hypothetical problems, however, may not excuse a court from its duty to mandate an 
authority to fulfill its ministerial duty to suitably repair a road that has suffered 
"unsuitable" disrepair. Financial or other hypothetical problems, if bona fide, at most 
might allow the court to temper or temporarily withhold contempt sanctions upon an 
authority's failure to immediately comply with a writ of mandamus. However, in the 
meantime, the authority and the public would be on notice that the authority would likely 
be liable for injuries and damages to persons and property resulting from the authority's 
failure to repair the road, including economic damages. This would provide the authority 
with the incentive to address its problem sooner rather than later. Upon utter 
unwillingness or inability of an authority to comply with a writ of mandamus, the court 
could resort to punitive or creative sanctions. Here, such sanctions could include 
requiring Fairfield to accept the funds tendered by Plaintiffs and immediately use such 
funds to contract for repair of the road. 
Amicus takes no position whether a court may order an authority to enhance its budget 
through bonding or taxation. However, here it appears that Fairfield has no financial 
excuse to not obey a writ of mandamus since Plaintiffs have offered to pay for the road 
repairs. 
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II. The Legislature Cannot Restrict or Extinguish a Governing Authority's 
Mandatory Duty to Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair. 
Appellants' brief at page 20-22 argues that, since the legislature has adopted the 
Rights-of-way Across Federal Lands Act (the "ROWAFL act"),4 which declares certain 
duties regarding certain R. S. 2477 rights-of-way discretionary, and, has not passed a 
similar law regarding the involved road, the legislature must have intended to preserve a 
mandatory duty of repair for the involved road. 
Amicus urges the Court to avoid this argument as unnecessary based upon Amicus' 
argument in Point I or based upon other of Appellant's arguments. The Court should be 
careful not to undertake to construe the ROWAFL act where the statute's construction is 
not central to this appeal. This is because Appellants' argument misapprehends the 
4
 Part 3 of Chapter 5 of Title 72, Utah Code, § 72-5-301, et seq. 
5
 Explicitly: "improvement" of any R. S. 2477highway under § 72-5-303(l)(b). Possibly 
by implication: "maintenance" of "a [R.S. 2477] highway [not] included on a highway 
system for vehicular travel" under § 72-5-303(l)(a). 
6
 Revised Statue 2477 (codified as 43 U.S.C. section 932) from the 1866 Mining Act, 
states "the right of way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved 
for public uses, is hereby granted." While the grant was repealed in 1976, rights of way 
previously created under the statute were "grandfathered." 
Section 72-5-103(1), cited by Appellants, states 
(a) The state and its political subdivisions are not required to maintain highways 
within R. S. 2477 rights-of-way for vehicular travel unless the R. S. 2477 right-of-
way encompasses a highway included on a highway system for vehicular travel. 
(b) A decision to improve or not improve an R. S. 2477 right-of-way is a purely 
discretionary function. 
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power of the legislature. Appellant's brief at page 22 is incorrect when it states, "As 
such, a court cannot compel the State through mandamus to maintain any R. S. 2477 
right-of-way." That this is an erroneous statement of the law is shown by the following 
discussion. 
A. Utah's Rights-of-Way Across Federal Lands Act Provisions Cannot 
Restrict or Extinguish Government Authorities' Mandatory Duty to 
Keep the Road Open and in Suitable Repair. 
Utah's legislature and political subdivisions have never had the power to 
eliminate an authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair. The 
Court may not in its analysis herein assume that Utah's legislature in the case of R. S. 
2477 rights-of-way has lawfully restricted governing authorities' mandatory duty to keep 
their rights-of-way open and in suitable repair. When faced with an on-point case 
Any suggestion that any legislative body has the power to extinguish the duty 
recognized in Whitesides, immediately implicates firmly established mandatory sovereign 
duties, and, fundamental rights of the public, including, but not limited to, the right to 
travel. This Court has recognized a right to travel under the Utah Constitution, in 
addition to the federal right, stating: 
"The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not 
include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways. 
The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and 
efficiency of our public roads. It enhances rather than infringes upon the 
right to travel. 
City ofSalina v. Wisden, 131 P.2d 981, 983 (Utah 1987). See also: The Law of Local 
Government Operations, Charles S. Rhyne,1980, §16.9: "...a municipality has no power 
"to deny a citizen the right to travel upon the highway and transport his property in the 
ordinary course of his business or pleasure, though this right may be regulated in 
accordance with the public interest and convenience. Ordinary use is the right of all." 
Escobedo v. State of California, 35 Cal. 2d 870, 222 P. 2d 1, 9 (1950), overruled on other 
grounds at 499 P.2d 979, 984: "The use of highways for purposes of travel and 
transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental right..." Also, 
Note 9, infra. 
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requiring construction of the ROWAFL act the Court would need to carefully consider 
the implications of the inherent duty of a jurisdictional authority to keep the road open 
and in suitable repair. To suggest that the legislature has the power to restrict or 
extinguish a highway authority's sovereign duty to keep any R. S. 2477 right-of-way 
open and in suitable repair is to necessarily suggest that the legislature also has the power 
to restrict or extinguish an authority's mandatory duty to keep open and suitably repair 
major arteries, residential streets and state highways. The law has never ceded such 
chaotic discretion to the state legislature or to political subdivisions.9 
B. The ROWAFL Act Could, in an Appropriate Case, Be Reconciled 
with the Whitesides Duty. 
Proper analysis of Utah's ROWAFL act in an on-point case, would first attempt to 
reconcile the statute to Whitesides, which could, as shown by the following discussion, be 
accomplished. Otherwise, inconsistent provisions of the ROWAFL act would need to be 
stricken down. 
For necessary perspective, it must initially be remembered that Whitesides' 
discussion of the common law mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable 
repair was specifically in reference to public rights-of-way by prescription, Whitesides, 
60 P. at 1033, which is the precise derivation of all rights-of-way originally established 
across federal lands under R. S. 2477. That many R. S. 2477 rights-of-way today are 
very rough vehicle "trails," when compared to modern improved roads, means only that 
Cf. The Chicago Motor Coach Company v. The City of Chicago, 337 111. 200, 169 N. E. 
22, 25 (1929): "Even the legislature has no power to deny a citizen the right to travel 
upon the highway and transport his property in the ordinary course of business or 
pleasure ..." 
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federal law was adopted and in 1896 when Whitesides was decided. That in the more 
modem world many roads are graded or paved does not change the analysis of the 
responsible jiiidiminh > 1111 s fqjarcliiK« more priimliu1 R J JA > ' rijj.lits-oi»\\a\. ' 
Most of Utah's ROWAFL act does not implicate the Whitesides duty. Subsection 
72-5-303(l)(b), Utah Code, regarding R. S. 24"^rights-of-way, clearly does not affect a 
hig>-* >. • :-. . .. . ;• ...r*ie repair, as such provision 
states only that a "decision to improve or not improve an R. S. 2477 right-of-way is a 
purely discretionan fmu lion " Improvements in K S. 2-17" roads would include actions 
bi > L\ . ^ f ..: open and in suiUihic tvpaiK ^*cii db paving. 
realigning, etc. Likewise irrelevant, is section 72-5-iUO^ u ; ) • w * ''""5 ^ •-• 
most, withdraws any waiver of sovereign immunit\ inuK !he Utah Governmental 
Immunity "let in I itle 63. Chapter 30d, I Jtah Code, for injuries resulting from use of R. 
S. 2477 rights-of-way. The withdraw al of waiver of so\ ereign imi ill n lit) • * >t 
eliminate the governing authority's mandatory duty to keep the road open and n suitable 
"Suitable repair" should be addressed in the specific iactual context of the non-
improved nature of the specific R. S. 2477 right-of-way. first allowing the authority to 
make its determination whether a proposed repair is. or is not, necessary as "suitable 
repair" considering the circumstances and history of the particular right-of-way. An 
authority's decision that an action was not necessary for "suitable repair" could be upheld 
if not arbitrary and capricious under the circumstances of the particular right-of-way and 
the specific repair issue. However, an authority's decision that de facto left the right-of-
way completely impassible would clearly be arbitrary and capricious under Whitesides. 
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repair any more than the preservation of sovereign immunity for judicial functions could 
relieve a court of its mandatory duty to rule on cases within its jurisdiction.l ] 
Only in considering maintenance in subsection (a) of section 72-5-303(1) does the 
ROWAFL act come near to violating Whitesides. It should first be noted that this 
provision does not universally apply to "any R. S. 2477 right-of-way" per App. Br., but 
only to a right-of-way that may not be "a highway included on a highway system for 
vehicular travel" - whatever that means. Next it should be noted that subsection (a) 
uses the word "maintain," not the words "keep open and in suitable repair" per 
Whitesides. If "maintain" concerns routine maintenance above and beyond the 
authority's duty "to keep the road open and in suitable repair," then subdivision (a) would 
not conflict with Whitesides. However, if "maintain" is considered to include action 
necessary "to keep the road open and in suitable repair," then subdivision (a) would 
unlawfully violate the Whitesides duty. 
The definition of "maintenance" at section 72-5-301(5) may conflict with 
Whitesides, depending upon construction. For example, subsection 72-5-30l(l)(5)(h) 
"clearing roadway of obstructing debris," unless construed to mean "clearing roadway of 
Regarding the duty to rule, see: Richards v. District Court of Weber County, 71 Utah 
473 at 478, 267 P. 779 at 781 (1928) cited in State v. Ruggeri, 19 Utah 2d 216 at 219, 429 
P.2d 969 at 970-71(1967); Ketchum Coal Co. v. Christensen, Judge, 48 Utah 214 at 221, 
159 P. 541 (1916), cited id.; State v. Hart, Judge, 19 Utah 438, 57 P. 415 at 416 (1899) 
cited id.; People of the Territory of Utah v. Van Tassel, 13 Utah 9, 43 P. 625 at 626 
(1896); Hathaway v. McConkie, 85 Utah 21 at 25, 38 P.2d 300 at 302 (1934). See also 
grounds for review under U. R. Civ. P. 65B(d) "(B)... failed to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of the office, trust or station ..." 
12
 Amicus is unaware of any definition of "a highway included on a highway system for 
vehicular travel" within the ROWAFL act. Under Whitesides, al] public rights-of-way by 
prescription as a result of vehicular use are part of a highway system for vehicular travel. 
13 
ohMfiitliii'i? debt'r I IMI <l M < i H ivndi« I'M »"'M' ' fosnl m in un11»(;iMc irp;nr ' ^oi i l i l 
violate Whitesides. Similarly, the general definition at the beginning of subsection (5), 
unless construed to accommodate Whitesides, would also potentially violate Whitesides. 
maintenance decisions discretionary, as does subsection (b) regarding "improvements" 
decisions, the Court could readily find that the legislature did not intend subsection (a) to 
Again, the foregoing is not an invitation for the Court to now construe the 
ROWAFL ;u : 'mt precisely the opp^ik Tin: Court should not slip into dicta that could 
unnecessa- . . ,-v.,-: , . : R 
S 2477 rights-of-way and other highways. The fundamental duty in Whitesides, the 
navigational star, should not be explicitly or implicitly compromised. 
CONCLUSION, 
The Court should rule consistently with Whitesides, again recognizing that 
authorities have a mandatory duty to keep the road open and in suitable repair and that 
mandamus is an a\ ailable remed> I he Cot n t shoi ild approach the R O to ' t X I T act \ \ • ith 
caution, being careful to not explicitly or implicitly con^romise the Whitesides 
fundamental duty applicable to all highways, including a,i R. S. 2477 rights-of-way. 
1}
 Subsection (5) reads, "'Maintenance' means any physical act of upkeep of a highway 
or repair of wear or damage whether from natural or oilu-r causes ..." 
•£L <k DATED this & day of February, 2008. 
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